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1. Introduction 
 
Over the last decade, inflation persistence has become one of the most intensely investigated 
topics in macroeconomics. This is explained by the crucial role of inflation dynamics on 
monetary policy design and its effectiveness. Several microeconomic interpretations are proposed 
to remedy the inability of New Keynesian Phillips curve models to replicate the high inflation 
persistence found in post-war U.S. data1. Researchers have proposed different mechanisms to 
build inflation persistence into the deep structure of the economy, thus making it invariant to 
changes in the monetary regime (Buiter and Jewitt (1989), Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Fuhrer 
(2000), Calvo et al. (2001), Christiano et al. (2005), Blanchard and Gali (2007)). Another 
approach is to assume that private agents face information-processing constraints (Roberts 
(1998), Ball (2000), Ireland (2000), Mankiw and Reis (2001), Sims (2001), Woodford (2001), 
Steinsson (2003)). Some other authors generate inflation persistence through the data generating 
process for the structural shocks hitting the economy (Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Ireland 
(2004), Dittmar et al. (2005)). 
An alternative view is that the degree of inflation persistence is not an inherent structural 
characteristic of industrial economies, but rather varies with the stability and transparency of the 
monetary policy regime (Sargent, 1999; Goodfriend and King, 2001). In particular, a group of 
models has emerged attempting to improve the empirical fit of the New Keynesian framework by 
augmenting it with imperfect credibility and learning (Huh and Lansing (2000), Erceg and Levin 
(2003), Andolfatto and Gomme (2003), Gaspar et al. (2006)). This literature asserts that the 
persistence puzzle arises because of the empirically questionable assumption of perfect policy 
transparency, and not because of any intrinsic shortcomings of the contract structure. The 
learning by the public of the intentions of the monetary authorities through observing real 
outcomes is likely to generate additional persistence in inflation dynamics. Criticizing this 
approach, Westelius (2005) questions, by eliminating discretionary monetary policy in favour of 
an appropriately specified Taylor rule, how much of the persistence is generated endogenously 
through imperfect credibility and transparency and how much is exogenously assumed.  
                                                 
1 A large empirical literature has found that inflation in developed countries exhibits very high persistence, 
approaching that of a random-walk process. Fuhrer and Moore (1995) are the first to show that the New Keynesian 
Phillips curve derived from overlapping wage contract fails to account for the observed persistence in inflation. See 
also Stock (2001) and Pivetta and Reis (2007).  
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Van der Cruijsen and Demertzis (2007), using the transparency measures of Eijffinger and 
Geraats (2006), have shown that more transparency is also associated with less inflation 
persistence. Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) confirm the negative relationship between 
transparency and inflation persistence by extending the transparency data set to more countries 
and a longer time period. Considering that inflation is set in a more backward looking manner, 
Eijffinger et al. (2008) find empirical support for an optimal intermediate degree of transparency 
at which inflation persistence is minimized. 
Some studies investigate the effect of transparency in taking account of openness of modern 
economies. Dillén and Nilsson (1998), using model simulation, show that the convergence to the 
central bank’s inflation target is somewhat faster when transparency is increased and that implies 
a smaller drift in nominal variables such as the exchange rate. Moreover, there is a clear 
reduction of variability in real variables such as the real exchange rate and the output gap. 
Kenneth and Posen (2001), assessing the importance of domestic inflation and interest rate 
shocks to G3 exchange rate volatility, find that increases in central bank transparency could 
meaningfully but not totally diminish that volatility. Empirical study by Chortareas et al. (2002) 
shows significant negative relationship between transparency and inflation, in particular, in 
countries adopting flexible exchange rate regime. Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) have found 
empirically that countries with more flexible exchange rates tends to be more transparent in the 
conduct of monetary policy, explained by the fact that the absence of an exchange rate peg 
eliminates one traditional device for monitoring central bank actions. 
The objective of our paper is to re-examine the persistence puzzle by focusing on the 
inflation-targeting regime in a New Keynesian open economy model without backward-looking 
component, where inflation persistence is introduced through the data generating process for the 
structural shocks hitting the economy. Under flexible exchange rate regime, we study how 
political transparency affects inflation, output gap and exchange rate dynamics, and evaluate how 
the effect of opacity depends on the structural parameters of the economy, such as domestic 
financial development and international trade openness. 
Our modelling choices are justified by recent developments in the literature of inflation 
persistence as well as on international financial markets. Under inflation targeting, i.e. 
discretionary monetary policy without inflationary bias, Benati (2008) has shown that inflation 
appears to be (nearly) purely forward-looking, so that no mechanism introducing backward-
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looking components is necessary to fit the data. Current developments on international financial 
markets have shown that there are considerable persistent real or nominal shocks reflected by the 
large speculative movements in the prices of petrol and other raw materials as well as in 
exchange rates between majors currencies. These shocks tend to feed progressively the 
inflationary processes, constituting hence great challenge for inflation targeting regimes, in 
particular when they are not sufficiently transparent about the preferences for output and inflation 
stabilisation.  
Our study is connected to the large literature assessing theoretically and empirically the pass-
through of exchange rate shocks to domestic prices and hence inflation dynamics (see among 
others, Dornbusch (1987) and Krugman (1987), Goldberg and Knetter (1997), Mennon (1995), 
Smets and Wouters (2002), Devereux and Engel (2002), Corsetti et al. (2008)). Our study 
contributes to this literature by studying how the political transparency of the central bank affects 
the pass-through of exchange rate shocks to the rest of the economy, in particular to the inflation 
dynamics. In view of the large movements of exchange rates under floating exchange rate 
regime, the pass-through of exchange rate shocks to domestic prices, and hence inflation and 
inflation expectations is of particular importance for monetary policy. Both the size of the pass-
through and its speed are essential for the proper assessment of the monetary policy transmission 
to prices as well as for inflation forecasts.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model and introduces incomplete 
information about the central bank preferences. Section 3 gives the equilibrium solutions of 
endogenous variables. Section 4 analyzes the nature of the relationship between monetary policy 
transparency and inflation, output gap and real exchange rate persistence. Section 5 examines the 
effect of transparency on macroeconomic volatility. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The small open-economy model 
 
We use a stylized New Keynesian model of a small open economy2 developed by Galí and 
Monacelli (2005) and Clarida et al. (2001) and introduce a time-varying premium on foreign 
                                                 
2 The model is a generalization of the canonical New Keynesian model for a closed economy developed by 
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Goodfriend and King (1997) and others, and carefully examined by Clarida et al. 
(1999). 
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bond holdings as in Leitemo and Söderström (2008), which is an important source of uncertainty 
in open economies.  
The small open home country trades with the rest of the world which is assumed to be a large 
foreign country. The micro-foundations of this model are based on the assumption that the two 
countries share preferences and technology and produce traded consumption goods. Concerning 
the home country, domestic firms use only labour to produce goods, and households consume 
both domestically produced and imported goods and enjoy leisure. 
The (log) real exchange rate, te , is defined in terms of the domestic price level as  
t
f
ttt ppse −+= ,                               (1) 
where ts  is the nominal exchange rate, 
f
tp  is the price level in the foreign economy, and tp  is 
the price level of domestically produced goods.  
The rate of inflation in the domestic goods sector, tπ , the output gap in the domestic 
economy (i.e., the log deviation of domestic output from its flexible-price level), tx , and the (log) 
real exchange rate are interrelated according to the following three equations: 
πεφδπβπ tttttt ex +++Ε= +1 , with 10 <β< , 10 << φ , 0>δ , (2) 
x
tttttttttt eeEEixEx εγπα +−+−−= +++ )()( 111 , with α , 0>γ , (3) 
e
ttttttt EieEe επ +−−= ++ )( 11 ,      (4) 
Equation (2) represents the open-economy New Keynesian Phillips curve, where the domestic 
inflation rate depends on expected future inflation ( 1+πΕ tt ) and current marginal cost, which is 
affected by the output gap and the real exchange rate. In effect, the latter affects marginal cost 
through the labour supply decision of households which value their wage relative to the consumer 
price index including prices of imported goods. The inflation shock, πε t ,  is due to productivity 
disturbances. 
Equation (3), an expectational IS curve, relates the output gap to the expected future output 
gap ( 1+tt xE ), the real interest rate and the real exchange rate. The real interest rate is defined as 
the difference between the nominal interest rate ( ti ) and the expected future inflation. The 
demand shock, xtε ,  reflects either productivity disturbances which affect the flexible-price level 
of output or, equivalently, changes in the natural real interest rate. 
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Finally, equation (4) is a real uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition, where the 
expected rate of real depreciation ( ttt eeE −+1 ) is related to the real interest rate differential 
between the domestic and foreign economies. Since all foreign variables are assumed to be 
exogenous and set to zero, they are absent in this equation as well as in the rest of the model. The 
exchange rate disturbance, etε , stands for a risk premium shock on foreign bond holding.  
We assume that all disturbances to the economy follow a first-order autoregressive process: 
j
t
j
tj
j
t e+= −1ερε ,   with exj ,,π= , 10 ≤≤ jρ  ;   (5) 
where jρ  represents the degree of persistence. 
The model is completed with a specification of the central bank’s loss function: 
∑∞
=
+=
0
22
0 )(2
1
t
tt
iCB xEL πλβ .          (6) 
The central bank’s loss depends on output gap and inflation variability around of zero targets. 
The central bank could be more or less transparent in the disclosure of information about its 
preferences, i.e. the relative weight (λ ) assigned to the output-gap objective. This corresponds to 
political transparency in the terminology given in Geraats (2002). In the following, we define the 
complete transparency of monetary policy as a benchmark situation where the central bank 
communicates the exact value of λ  to the public, in other words, the variance of λ  is zero 
( 02 =λσ ). In this case, the expected value of λ , denoted by λλ =)(tE , is equal to its realized 
value, i.e. λλ = . When the variance of λ  is superior to zero ( 02 >λσ ) and increases, central 
bank transparency decreases or alternatively central bank opacity increases. In the presence of 
opacity, the expected value of λ  could be different from the true one, i.e. λλ ≠ . As we will 
show below, the opacity as well as preference perception error have important implications for 
monetary policy decision-making.  
The central bank minimizes its loss function (6) taking account of the economic model 
defined by equations (2)-(4). The Lagrangian for this problem is given by: 
∑∞
=
++
+++
+
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−−−−+−−
−−−Ε−−+
=Λ
0
11
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1
22
2
1
0
])([
])()([
][)(
t e
ttttttt
e
t
x
tttttttttt
x
t
ttttttttt
EieEe
eeEEixEx
exx
E
επμ
εγπαμ
εφδπβπμπλ ππ
,                 (7)  
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where jtμ , exj  ,, π= , are Lagrange multipliers associated with equations (2)-(4) respectively. 
The first-order conditions for this minimisation problem are: 
0=−=∂
Λ∂ πμππ ttt ,        (8) 
0=−+=∂
Λ∂ x
ttt
t
x
x
μδμλ π ,       (9) 
0=−−=∂
Λ∂ e
t
x
t
ti
μαμ ,        (10) 
0=−−=∂
Λ∂ e
t
x
t
te
μγμ .        (11) 
From condition (8), it follows that tt πμπ = . Using conditions (10) and (11), we obtain 
0)( =− xtμαγ . Assuming that γα ≠ , then we get 0=xtμ  and consequently 0=etμ . Using these 
results in condition (9), we get the targeting rule in the sense of Svensson (2002):  
ttx πλδ−= .          (12) 
This rule is also valid for the next period, hence we have: 
11 ++ −= tttt ExE πλδ                    (13) 
Using equations (2)-(4) and (12)-(13), we obtain the instrument rule in the sense of Svensson 
(2002):  
.
))(1(
])1([)1(
1))(1(1)])(1([
)1(
1 2
22
22
2
γαδδφ
δεεγδδφεδ
γαδδφ
δφ
γαδδφλ
δδλβ πππ −++
++−++
+−+++−++
−−
+ +++= t
e
t
x
t
ttttttt eEEEi   (14) 
The optimal interest rate reacts positively to the expected future inflation if 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −−−>− ++
−−
+ )1()1(
)1(
1 22
2
2 ;max δ
δφ
δλ
δδλβ
δ
δφγα  or ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −−−<− ++
−−
+ 22
2
2 1)1(
)1(
1
;min δ
δφ
δλ
δδλβ
δ
δφγα . It reacts 
positively to the expected future real exchange rate as well as xtε  and πε t   if 21 δ
δφγα +−>− , and 
positively to etε  if  21 δ
δφγ +<  or γα δ
δφ <+ + 21 . 
 
3. Equilibrium solutions under persistent shocks 
 
Using equations (3)-(4) and (12)-(14), we obtain: 
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π
γαβλ
δ
γα
α
γαγαβλ
δδλβ
γαβλ
φδγαβλ εεεπ tetxttttt eeE )(1)(
)]1([
)(
)(
1 2
2
−−−−
+−
−
+−
+ +−++= ,   (15) 
π
ββ
φ
βλ
δ εππ ttttt eE 111 2 −−= ++ .        (16) 
Under the rational expectations hypothesis, we solve endogenous variables using the method 
of undetermined coefficients (McCallum, 1983). In the following, we focus on the solutions of 
tπ , 1+ttE π , te  and 1+tteE . The solutions of other endogenous variables, tx , 1+tt xE  and ti , can be 
obtained using the solutions of tπ , 1+ttE π , te  and 1+tteE , and equations (12)-(14). In accordance 
with the method of undetermined coefficients, we guess that the solutions of tπ , te , 1+ttE π  and 
1+tteE  take the following forms: 
x
t
e
ttt εζεζεζπ π 321  ++= ,        (17) 
x
t
e
ttte εχεχεχ π 321  ++= ,            (18) 
x
ttt
e
tttttttt 1312111   ++++ ΕΕ+ΕΕ+ΕΕ=Ε εζεζεζπ π ,    (19) 
x
ttt
e
tttttttte 1312111  ++++ ΕΕ+ΕΕ+ΕΕ=Ε εχεχεχ π ,    (20) 
where iζ  and iχ , 3,2,1=i , are coefficients that we seek to determine in order to find the 
equilibrium solutions of tπ , 1+ttE π , te  and 1+tteE . Using equation (5), equations (19) and (20) 
are rewritten as: 
x
txt
e
tettttt ερζερζερζπ ππ 3211  Ε+Ε+Ε=Ε + ,     (21) 
x
txt
e
tettttte ερχερχερχ ππ 3211  Ε+Ε+Ε=Ε + .     (22) 
Substituting 1+Ε ttπ  and 1+Ε tte  given by equations (21)-(22) into equations (15)-(16), we obtain: 
π
ββ
φ
βλ
δππ επερζερζερζ tttxtxtetettt e 11321 2 −−=Ε+Ε+Ε + ,          (23) 
. )()(
)]1([
)(
)(
321 2
2
γαβλ
δεαβλεβλε
γαβλ
δδλβ
γαβλ
φδγαβλππ
ππερχερχερχ − +−−
+−
−
+− ++=Ε+Ε+Ε tetxtttxtxtetettt e     (24) 
Solving equations (23)-(24) for tπ  and te , and comparing these solutions with equations (17)-
(18), we obtain equations relating undetermined coefficients iζ  and iχ  and their expected value. 
Solving them, taking account of the opacity about the central bank preferences, leads to:3 
                                                 
3 We use a second-order Taylor development to evaluate the effect of opacity. The details of solutions can be 
obtained upon request addressed to authors.  
 9
{ }])1)()[(1()()1()()( 2331 φδδγαρλγαλρρλγαφδλλζ πππ ++−−−+−−−Ψ= , (25) 
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}])1)([())(1({)( 2231 φδδγαργαδδφρλγαλζ ππ ++−−−++−Ψ−=Εt ,        (27) 
⎪⎭
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⎫
⎪⎩
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−++−+Ψ=Ε
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}])1)([()({ 2232 φδδγαλδφρλλλαφαζζ ++−+−Ω=−= e ,               (29) 
}])1)(][()1[())(1({ 22232
2 φδδγαρλβδλδφρλλδαχχ λλα ++−−++−+=−= Ω ee ,    (30) 
32
32 ])1)([( λαφφδδγαζαζ ++−Ω=Ε−=Ε tt ,                  (31) 
})1(])1][())(1[({ 2222232 λσφαδρδλαβρλδφδγαδχαχ eett ++−++−+Ω=Ε−=Ε ,          (32) 
where 
,
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1
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222222
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ργαφσδδργαφλβλδδ
λφδρδγαρφδγαλβφδδγα
λ
.  
Substituting the solutions of iζ  and iχ  and their expected value into equations (17)-(20) 
gives the equilibrium solutions of tπ , te , 1+Ε ttπ  and 1+Ε tte . It is then easy to obtain the solutions 
of tx  and 1+tt xE  using equations (12)-(13), and that of ti  using equation (14).  
We remark in examining the above solutions that if γα = , an increase in opacity will have 
no effect on the level and variability of endogenous variables. In the following, we will study the 
cases where we have γα ≠ . 
 
4. The effect of central bank’s opacity on the persistence 
 
The equilibrium solutions of tπ , te , tx , 1+Ε ttπ , 1+Ε tte  and 1+tt xE  associate the effects of 
persistent shocks with the degree of central bank opacity. Therefore, they allow us to study how 
the opacity affects the persistence and variability of endogenous variables. In the following, we 
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will not discuss the effects of opacity on the transmission of persistent shocks to the level and 
variability of tx  and 1+tt xE , since they could be easily deduced from the results concerning tπ  
and 1+Ε ttπ  using equations (12)-(13). We also neglect the effects of xtε  since equations (29)-(32) 
show that they are easily deductible from these of πε t .   
 
4.1. The effects of opacity and the persistence due to inflation shocks 
 
The effects of persistent inflation and exchange rate shocks are transmitted to the economy 
through a complex mechanism. The central bank preferences about inflation and output gap 
targets affect the current inflation and real exchange rate through its effects on nominal interest 
rate. The perception of the central bank preferences (i.e. the expected value and variance of λ ) 
plays a role in this transmission mechanism through the expectations of inflation and exchange 
rate. These expectations are taken into account by the central bank in the determination of 
optimal nominal interest rate according to equation (14), which implies that if the Phillips curve 
is independent of exchange rate, i.e. 0=φ , then the nominal interest rate will only depend on the 
expected future inflation and exogenous shocks.  
Deriving the solutions of 1ζ , 1χ , 1ζtΕ  and 1χtΕ  given by (25)-(28) with respect to the 
variance of λ  gives the effects of opacity on the persistence of tπ , te , 1+Ε ttπ , and 1+Ε tte  due to 
persistent inflation shocks. The results are summarized in the following propositions. 
 
Proposition 1a: An increase in opacity reinforces the effects of persistent inflation shocks on the 
expected future inflation if  21 δ
φδγα +−>−  and vice versa.  
 
Proof: In the presence of persistent inflation shocks, the effect of opacity on expected future 
inflation is defined as 2
1
2
1
λ
π
λ σ
ζρ
σ
π
∂
Ε∂
∂
Ε∂ =+ ttt , which can be examined through deriving 1ζtΕ , given by 
equation (27), with respect to 2λσ : 
])1)()[(1)(1()( 2225222
1 φδδγαρδγαλδφρ ππσ
ζ
λ
++−−+−Ψ=∂
Ε∂ t . 
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It is straightforward to see that: 02
1 >∂
Ε∂
λσ
ζt  if  21 δ
φδγα +
−>−  or 021 <∂
Ε∂
λσ
ζt  if  21 δ
φδγα +
−<− .   Q.E.D. 
The opacity affects the expected future inflation and real exchange rate. It influences the 
macroeconomic performance through several channels which may have contradictory effects. If 
the Phillips curve is independent of the real exchange rate, i.e. 0=φ , the expected future 
inflation will be determined uniquely by equation (16) independently of other endogenous 
variables. In this case, an increase in opacity will have a negative effect on the current and 
expected future inflation rates in the presence of persistent inflation shocks (Appendix A).  
The introduction of the real exchange rate effect in the Phillips curve induces complex 
interaction through IS curve and the UIP. In effect, a decrease in the current and expected future 
inflation rates will induce that of the current and expected future real exchange rates. These 
variations will induce the following effects: a decrease in the expected future inflation implies an 
increase in the expected future output gap and a decrease of real interest rate, and therefore an 
increase in the demand for the domestic goods; a decrease in the current real exchange rate 
reduces the current inflation rate and increases the demand for domestic goods; a decrease in the 
expected future real exchange rate reduces the demand for domestic goods. If the positive effects 
on the domestic goods demand globally dominate the negative ones (i.e. there is an inflationary 
pressure), the previous negative effect of opacity on the expected future inflation will be 
reversed. This explain why the relationship between the parameters α , γ , φ  and δ  plays an 
important role in determining the final effects of opacity. In the presence of persistent inflation 
shocks, more opacity does not increase systematically the inflation expectations and its effects 
depend on these structural parameters. 
We notice that the parameter γ  describes how the domestic goods demand is impacted by the 
variation of real exchange rate due to the substitution effects between domestic and foreign goods 
and hence represents the degree of trade openness; α  captures the effect of a variation of real 
interest rate on the domestic goods demand and hence represents the degree of domestic financial 
development; δ  represents the slope of the Phillips curve; and the parameter φ  reveals the part 
of the wage claims which is influenced by the weight of the foreign goods in the consumption of 
domestic workers, i.e. the effect of real exchange rate on marginal cost.  
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Proposition 1b: i) An increase in opacity reinforces the effects of persistent inflation shocks on 
the expected future real exchange rate if one of the following pairs of conditions is checked: 
1)  πβρ
δλ 21+>  and ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧>− −−
−
21
)1(;0max δρλβ
ρφδ
π
πγα ; 
2) πβρ
δλ 21+>   and 21 δ
φδγα +−<− ; 
3) πβρ
δλ 21+<  and 22 11
)1(
δ
φδ
δρλβ
ρφδ γα
π
π
+−−
− −<−< ; 
4) πβρ
δλ 21+<  and 22 1
)1(
1 δρλβ
ρφδ
δ
φδ
π
πγα −−
−
+ <−<− .  
ii) An increase in opacity reduces the effects of persistent inflation shocks on the expected future 
real exchange rate if one of the following pairs of conditions is checked: 
1) πβρ
δλ 21+>  and 21
)1(
δρλβ
ρφδ
π
πγα −−
−>−  ;  
2) πβρ
δλ 21+>  and 021 <−<− + γαδ
φδ ;  
3) πβρ
δλ 21+<  and 0;max 22 1
)1(
1
<−<⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧− −−
−
+ γαδρλβ
ρφδ
δ
φδ
π
π ;  
4) πβρ
δλ 21+<  and ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧<− −−
−
+
−
22 1
)1(
1
;min δρλβ
ρφδ
δ
φδ
π
πγα .   
Proof: See Appendix B.   Q.E.D. 
 
In the conditions specified in the first part of Proposition 1b, we find that, besides the usual 
conditions on the relationship between α , γ ,  φ  and δ , the estimated value ofλ  plays also a 
significant role. If πβρ
δλ 21+> , i.e. the central bank puts in average a relatively high weight on the 
output target, the opacity reinforces the effect of persistent inflation shocks for relatively high or 
low value of γα −  according to conditions 1 and 2. In other words, if the public estimates that 
the central bank puts more weight on the output target, so more transparency allows reducing the 
inflation pressure and hence expected future depreciation of domestic currency. In contrast, more 
opacity will increase the inflation pressure and hence expected future real exchange rate. If 
πβρ
δλ 21+< , an increase in opacity reinforces the effect of persistent inflation shocks for 
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intermediate value or of γα −  according to conditions 3 and 4. Similar comments can be made 
for the opposite cases enunciated in the second part of Proposition 1b.  
 
Proposition 1c: An increase in opacity reinforces the effects of persistent inflation shocks on the 
current inflation rate if )1(21 πλ
λλ
δ
φδ ργα −+ −−>− , and vice versa.  
 
Proof: The effects of opacity on inflation persistence ( 2 12 λ
π
λ σ
ζρ
σ
π
∂
∂
∂
∂ =t ) is obtained by deriving 1ζ   
given by equation (25) with respect to 2λσ : 
{ } .)1())(1(])1)([()( 22242221 πππσζ ρρφγαδδλφδδγαλφδρλλλ −−+++−+−Ψ=∂∂  
Having  021 >∂
∂
λσ
ζ  is equivalent to have:  )1(21 πλ
λλ
δ
φδ ργα −+ −−>− .       Q.E.D. 
 
The condition )1(21 πλ
λλ
δ
φδ ργα −+ −−>−  puts in relation several important parameters of the 
economy. This condition is more or less restrictive if the perception error λ
λλ −  of the central bank 
preferences is positive or negative respectively. In fact, if 0>−λλλ , it means that the value of λ  
perceived by the private agents is higher than the realized one. In this case, the effect of persistent 
inflation shocks on the current inflation rate is stronger due to the fact that the private agents 
expect higher future inflation.  
 
Proposition 1d: An increase in opacity reinforces the effects of persistent inflation shocks on the 
current real exchange rate if either of the following pairs of conditions is satisfied:  
1)  πβρ
δλ 21+<  and 22 1)1(
)(
δ
φδ
ρλβδλ
ρλλδφ
π
πγα +−+
− −−>−  ;  
2) πβρ
δλ 21+>  and 22 1)1(
)(
δ
φδ
ρλβδλ
ρλλδφ
π
πγα +−+
− −−<− .  
An increase in opacity reduces the effects of persistent inflation shocks on the current real 
exchange rate if the second inequality in these pairs of conditions is inversed.  
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Proof: The effects of opacity on the current real exchange rate ( 212 λ
π
λ σ
χρ
σ ∂
∂
∂
∂ =te ) are obtained by 
deriving the solution of 1χ  given by (26) with respect to 2λσ  as follows:  
λ
φδδγαρλβδλρλλδφδρρλδγαδ
σ
χ ππππ
λ
}++−−++−+{−−+Ψ
∂
∂ = ])1)()[(1()()1()1())(1( 2222422221 . 
It follows from the previous derivative that:  
   )1)()(1()1()()1(0 222221 δγαρλβδλφδρλβδλρλλδφδ πππσ
χ
λ
+−−+<−+−−+−⇒>∂
∂ . 
Solving the above inequality for cases where πβρ
δλ 21+<  and πβρδλ
21+> leads to the conditions given 
in Proposition 1d.           Q.E.D. 
 
The first pair of conditions in Proposition 1d means that if λ  is low enough so that πβρδλ
21+< , 
the effect of opacity on the real exchange rate persistence is positive if the demand of domestic 
goods depend more strongly on the real interest rate than on the real exchange rate in the sense 
that 
)1(])1[(
)(
22 δ
φδ
ρλβδλ
ρλλδφ
π
πγα +−+
− −−>− . This condition becomes more restrictive if 0<− λλ , i.e. 
the expected value of λ  is inferior to its realized value, and less restrictive if 0<− λλ . Similar 
discussion can be made for the second pair of conditions. 
 
4.2. The effects of opacity and the persistence due to exchange rate shocks 
 
In order to analyze how the opacity affects the pass-through of persistent exchange rate 
shocks to the inflation and real exchange rates, we derive the solutions of 2ζ , 2χ , 2ζtΕ  and 
3χtΕ  given respectively by equations (29)-(31) with respect to the variance of λ . That gives the 
effect of opacity on the persistence of tπ , te , 1+Ε ttπ , and 1+Ε tte  due to persistent exchange rate 
shocks. The results are summarized in the following propositions. 
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Proposition 2a: An increase in opacity reinforces the effects of persistent exchange rate shocks 
on the expected future inflation when 0>− γα  or 21 δ
φδγα +−<−  but weakens them if 
021 <−<− + γαδ
φδ .  
 
Proof: In the case of exchange rate shocks, the effects of opacity on the expected future inflation 
is defined as 2
2
2
1
λλ σ
ζρ
σ
π
∂
Ε∂
∂
Ε∂ =+ tett . Deriving 2ζtΕ  given by equation (31) with respect to 2λσ  gives: 
322222 ])1)()[(1)((2
2 λφρφδδγαδγααδ
λσ
ζ
e
t Ω++−+−=∂
Ε∂ .      
It is straightforward to see that: 02
2 >∂
Ε∂
λσ
ζt  if 0>− γα  or 21 δ
φδγα +−<−  ; and  022 <∂
Ε∂
λσ
ζt  if  
021 <−<− + γαδ
φδ .           Q.E.D. 
 
In the presence of persistent exchange rate shocks, more opacity does not systematically 
induce an  increase in the expected inflation and its effect depends on the respective but 
contradictory influence of the parameters γ , α , φ  and δ . The direct transmission channel of 
exchange rate shocks through the goods market (IS curve) is neutralised by the optimal interest 
rate rule. Consequently, the opacity affects how persistent exchange rate shocks are transmitted to 
the expected future inflation first through the Phillips curve and then the IS curve. As we have 
discussed before, if the Phillips curve is independent of the real exchange rate, i.e. 0=φ , the 
expected future inflation will be determined uniquely by equation (16) and will only depend on 
inflation shock. Consequently, the opacity will have in this case no effect on the current and 
expected future inflation in the presence of persistent exchange rate shock. 
A positive value to φ  establishes the linkage between the exchange rate shocks and the 
current and expected future inflation through the Phillips curve. An increase in the value of φ  
implies that the inflation rate is more directly affected by exchange rate shocks. The higher is the 
value of φ ,  the lower is the gain of competitiveness due to positive exchange rate shocks and 
hence more quickly the exchange rate shocks is transmitted to the current inflation as well as to 
inflation expectations due to their persistence.  
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In the presence of persistent exchange rate shocks, the effect of opacity is clearly tied with the 
introduction of real exchange rate effect in the Phillips curve, inducing complex interaction 
between endogenous variables through the Phillips curve, the IS curve and the UIP. If 0>− γα , 
the effect of opacity on 2ζtΕ  is always positive since the effect of an increase in the expected 
future inflation dominates that due to an increase in the expected future real exchange rate on the 
domestic goods demand. For small values of γα − , the effect of opacity is also positive. It 
becomes negative for intermediate values of γα − .  
 
Proposition 2b: i) An increase in opacity reinforces the effects of persistent exchange rate 
shocks on the expected future real exchange rate if one of the following pairs of conditions is 
satisfied:  
1) 
eβρ
δλ 21+<  and ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −−>− −+
−
+ e
e
ρλβδ
ρφδ
δ
φδγα 22 1
)1(
1
;max  ; 
2) 
eβρ
δλ 21+>  and 
e
e
ρλβδ
ρφδ
δ
φδ γα −+
−
+ −<−<− 22 1
)1(
1
;  
3) 
eβρ
δλ 21+<  and ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −−<− −+
−
+ e
e
ρλβδ
ρφδ
δ
φδγα 22 1
)1(
1
;min . 
ii) An increase in opacity reduces the effects of persistent exchange rate shocks on the expected 
future exchange rate if: 
1) β
δλ 21+<  and 
e
e
ρλβδ
ρφδ
δ
φδ γα −+
−
+ −<−<− 22 1
)1(
1
 ; 
2) 
eβρ
δλ 21+>  and 
e
e
ρλβδ
ρφδγα −+
−−>− 21
)1(  ; 
3) 
eβρ
δ
β
δ λ 22 11 ++ <<  and 22 11
)1(
δ
φδ
ρλβδ
ρφδ γα +−+
− −<−<−
e
e  ; 
4) 
eβρ
δλ 21+>  and 21 δ
φδγα +−<− .  
 
Proof: See Appendix C.     Q.E.D. 
 
According to Proposition 2b, if λ  is small enough, γα −  must be large enough or small 
enough to ensure that an increase in opacity reinforces the effect of persistent exchange rate 
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shocks on the expected future exchange rate. In contrast, if λ  is high enough, γα −  must be 
limited in an interval to produce the same effects. In these cases, more transparency allows 
reducing the transmission of persistent exchange rate shocks to the expected future real exchange 
rate.  
When λ  is larger enough, an increase in opacity reduces the effects of persistent exchange 
rate shocks on the expected future exchange rate if γα −  is large enough or small enough. For 
intermediate values of γα − , more opacity can also reduce the effects of persistent exchange 
shock if β
δλ 21+<  or 
eβρ
δ
β
δ λ 22 11 ++ << . 
 
Proposition 2c: i) An increase in opacity reinforces the effects of persistent exchange rate shocks 
on the current inflation rate if one of the following conditions is checked: 
1) })1( ;0{max 21 eργα λλλδ
φδ −
+ −−>− ; 
2) } )1( ;0{min 21 eργα λλλδ
φδ −
+ −−<− .  
ii) An increase in opacity reduces the effects of persistent exchange rate shocks on the current 
inflation rate if one of the following pairs of conditions is verified: 
1) )1(0 21 eργα λλλδ
φδ −
+ −−<−<  and  eρλλλ 1>− ; 
2) 0)1(21 <−<−− −+ γαρλλλδ
φδ
e  and eρλ
λλ 1<− .     
 
Proof: See Appendix D.      Q.E.D.  
 
In Proposition 2c and similar to what has happened on the expected future inflation, if the 
value of γα  −  is too high or too low, an increase in opacity reinforces the effect of persistent 
exchange rate shocks on the current inflation. In other words, more transparency helps 
diminishing the transmission of persistent exchange rate shocks to the current inflation. For 
intermediate values of γα  − , an increase in opacity has the opposite effects. To the difference of 
the expected future inflation, the conditions defining the critical value of γα  −  are limited by the 
rate of preference perception error ( λ
λλ− ) when it concerns the current inflation rate.  
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We remark that in the conditions given in Proposition 2c, the expression )1(21 eργ λλλδ
φδ −
+ −−  
is the similar to the one which appears in the condition in Proposition 1c.  
 
Proposition 2d: i) An increase in opacity reinforces the effects of persistent exchange rate 
shocks on the current exchange rate if either of the following groups of conditions is satisfied:  
1) 
eβρ
δλ 21+<  and ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ +−>− −+
−
+ )1(
)(
1 22
 ;0max
e
e
ρλβδλ
δφρλλ
δ
φδγα  ; 
2) 
eβρ
δλ 21+<  and ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ +−<− −+
−
+ )1(
)(
1 22
 ;0min
e
e
ρλβδλ
δφρλλ
δ
φδγα  ; 
3) 
eβρ
δλ 21+> , 
)1(
1
2
2
δρ
ρλβδ
λ
λλ
+
−+− <
e
e  and 
)1(
)(
1 22
0
e
e
ρλβδλ
δφρλλ
δ
φδγα −+
−
+ +−<−< ; 
4) 
eβρ
δλ 21+> , 
)1(
1
2
2
δρ
ρλβδ
λ
λλ
+
−+− >
e
e   and 0
)1(
)(
1 22
<−<+− −+
−
+ γαρλβδλ
δφρλλ
δ
φδ
e
e .  
ii) An increase in opacity reduces the effects of persistent exchange rate shocks on the current 
real exchange rate if the first condition in the groups of conditions 1 and 2 is inversed, and the 
first and second conditions in the groups of conditions 3 and 4 are inversed. 
 
Proof: See Appendix E.     Q.E.D. 
 
If 
eβρ
δλ 21+< , i.e. the central bank is perceived to be relatively conservative (with higher 
aversion to inflation), an increase in opacity reinforces the effects of persistent exchange rate 
shocks on the current real exchange rate both when γα −  is sufficiently large or small. When the 
central bank is perceived to be relatively accommodative, i.e.
eβρ
δλ 21+> , an increase in opacity 
reinforces the effects of persistent exchange rate shocks for two intervals of intermediate values 
of γα − , which are positive if the rate of preference perception error is sufficiently small, i.e. 
)1(
1
2
2
δρ
ρλβδ
λ
λλ
+
−+− <
e
e , and negative in the opposite case. Similar comments can be made for the 
second part of Proposition 2d. 
 
5. The effects of opacity on macroeconomic volatility 
 19
 
We examine in this section the effects of opacity on the variability of inflation and real 
exchange rate. Since the effect of opacity on the variability of output is similar to this on 
inflation, we will neglect it in the following.  
Using equations (17) and (18), the variances of inflation and real exchange rate are 
decomposed in three parts as follows: 
]var[ ]var[ ]var[]var[ 23
2
2
2
1
x
t
e
ttt εζεζεζπ π ++= ,     (33) 
]var[]var[ ]var[]var[ 23
2
2
2
1
x
t
e
ttte εχεχεχ π ++= .          (34) 
Denote that 2]var[ πσπ =t , 2 ]var[ ete σ= , 2 ]var[ πεπ σε =t  and 2 ]var[ eet εσε = . Using the value of 1ζ  
and 1χ  given respectively by equation (25)-(26) in equations (33)-(34), we then derive the effect 
of opacity on the variances of inflation and real exchange rate due to persistent inflation shocks 
as follows: 
,
])1)()[(1()(
)1()()(
)()1(2
2
23
3
223
22
22
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
++−−−+
−−−−+Ψ=∂∂
∂
φδδγαρλγαλ
ρρλγαφδλλφργαλδδσσ
σ
π
ππ
π
λε
π
π
    (35)  
.
])()[)(1(
)]1())()(1[(
)()()1(2
2
2222
22
2223
22
22
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
+−−++
−−−−+−+Ψ=∂∂
∂
πλ
ππ
π
λε ρλσλλλγαδ
ρλδφλρλγαδλ
λ
λδφργαλδδσσ
σ
π
e    (36) 
In the following, we derive conditions under which an increase in opacity reinforces the 
effects of persistent inflation and exchange rate shocks. In order to keep our paper at a reasonable 
length, we do not give the conditions under which an increase in opacity reduces the effects of 
persistent shocks on macroeconomic variability. 
 
Proposition 3a: In the presence of persistent inflation shocks, an increase in opacity will increase 
the variance of both inflation and real exchange rate if 
0])1)(1)(1(4[ 2224222 >−−++−Θ=Δ πππ ρρλβδδλφδ  and one of the following groups of 
conditions is checked: 
1) 
)1)(1)(1(2 222 ππ
π
ρρλβδδλ
δφγα −−++
Δ+Θ>− ,  πβρ
δλ 21+<  and 0>Θ ; 
2) 
)1)(1)(1(2 222 ππ
π
ρρλβδδλ
δφγα −−++
Δ−Θ>− ,  πβρ
δλ 21+>  and 0<Θ ; 
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3) 
)1)(1)(1(2 222 ππ
π
ρρλβδδλ
δφγα −−++
Δ−Θ<− ,  πβρ
δλ 21+<  and 0>Θ ; 
4) 
)1)(1)(1(2 222 ππ
π
ρρλβδδλ
δφγα −−++
Δ+Θ<− , πβρ
δλ 21+>  and 0<Θ ; 
5) 
)1)(1)(1(2)1)(1)(1(2 222222 ππ
π
ππ
π
ρρλβδδλ
δφ
ρρλβδδλ
δφ γα −−++
Δ−Θ
−−++
Δ+Θ <−< , πβρδλ
21+>  and 0>Θ ; 
6) 
)1)(1)(1(2)1)(1)(1(2 222222 ππ
π
ππ
π
ρρλβδδλ
δφ
ρρλβδδλ
δφ γα −−++
Δ+Θ
−−++
Δ−Θ <−< , πβρδλ
21+<  and 0<Θ ; 
where )]1(2)[1()1( 22223 ππλππ ρλρσδρρλβ −−++−=Θ . 0>Θ  ( 0<Θ ) is equivalent to 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧> +
−−+−
)1(
)1()1)(1(22
22
322
,0max δρ
ρρλβδρλ
λ π
πππσ   (
)1(
)1()1)(1(22
22
322
δρ
ρρλβδρλ
λ π
πππσ +
−−+−<  respectively ). 
 
Proof: See Appendix F.          Q.E.D.  
 
According to equations (35)-(36), the persistent inflation shocks, and hence the opacity, have 
no effect on the variances of inflation and real exchange rate if their effects on the demand 
through two channels (the direct effect through the substitution effect due to a variation of real 
exchange rate and the indirect effect through the real interest rate) offset each other, i.e. γα = .  
In the case where γα ≠ , an increase in opacity also has no effect on the variance of inflation if 
the rate of preference perception error is such that πφδρ
φδδγα
λ
λλ ++−− = )1)(( 2 . Similarly, an increase in 
opacity also has no effect on the variance of real exchange rate if the perception error of the 
public is such that 22
2222
))(1)(1(
)1())(1()1(
λγαδρ
λρδφσργαδ
λ
ρλρλ
π
πλπππ
−+−
−−−+−+ = .  
In the cases where γα ≠  and where the conditions on the perception error leading to the 
absence of opacity effect are not satisfied, more opacity will increase the variance of inflation and 
that of real exchange rate both when γα −  is sufficiently large or small as shown by the 
conditions 1-4 of Proposition 3a, with restrictions imposed on the value of λ  and the initial 
value of 2λσ .  For intermediate values of  γα − , more opacity will also increase the variance of 
inflation and that of real exchange rate under conditions 5 or 6 of Proposition 3a. Under the 
condition 5, λ   and 2λσ  must be sufficiently high as indicated by the associated supplementary 
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conditions. In contrast, under the condition 6, the associated supplementary conditions show that 
λ  and 2λσ  must be sufficiently low.  
 The critical values for γα − , i.e. 2222 ))(1)(1)(1(2 γαρρλβδδλ
δφ
ππ
π
−−−++
Δ±Θ , which are important for 
determining the sense of the effect of opacity on the variances of inflation and real exchange rate, 
depend on other parameters. In particular, among these parameters, we remark that an increase in 
2λσ  induces that of Θ  and hence the critical value of γα −  and an increase in λ  has ambiguous 
effects on it.  
To determine how the opacity affects macroeconomic volatility in the presence of persistent 
exchange rate shocks, we use the solutions of 2ζ  and 2χ  given respectively by equation (29) and 
(30) in equations (33) and (34) and then we derive the effect of opacity on the variance of 
inflation and real exchange rate due to the persistent exchange rate shocks as follows: 
22243223 }])1)([()({))(1(222
22 φδδγαλδφρλλρλδφαγαδ
λε
π
σσ
σ ++−+−−+Ω=∂∂
∂
ee
e
,  (37)  
2
222224223
22
22 }])1)(][()1[())(1({))(1(2
λ
φδδγαρλβδλδφρλλδρλδφαγαδ
σσ
σ
λε
++−−++−+−+Ω
∂∂
∂ = eee
e
e .    (38) 
 
Proposition 3b: In the presence of persistent exchange rate shocks, more opacity will increase 
the variance of inflation and that of real exchange rate if 
0)1()1)(1(4])1(2[)1( 42222222222222 >−+−+−−−+=Δ λδφρλβδρδσρρλφδδ λ eeeee  and if one of the 
following groups of conditions is checked: 
1) 
)1()1)(1(2
)]1(2[)1(
222
2222
ee
e
ee
ρλβδλρδ
ρλσρδφδ λγα −+−+
Δ+−−+>− ,  
eβρ
δλ 21+< and 2
2 )1(22
e
e
ρ
ρλ
λσ −>  ; 
2) 
)1()1)(1(2
)]1(2[)1(
222
2222
ee
e
ee
ρλβδλρδ
ρλσρδφδ λγα −+−+
Δ−−−+>− , 
eβρ
δλ 21+>  and  2
2 )1(22
e
e
ρ
ρλ
λσ −< ; 
3) 
)1()1)(1(2
)]1(2[)1(
222
2222
ee
e
ee
ρλβδλρδ
ρλσρδφδ λγα −+−+
Δ−−−+<− , 
eβρ
δλ 21+<   and 2
2 )1(22
e
e
ρ
ρλ
λσ −> ; 
4) 
)1()1)(1(2
)]1(2[)1(
222
2222
ee
e
ee
ρλβδλρδ
ρλσρδφδ λγα −+−+
Δ+−−+<− , 
eβρ
δλ 21+>  and 2
2 )1(22
e
e
ρ
ρλ
λσ −< ; 
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5) 
)1()1)(1(2
)]1(2[)1(
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ee
e
ee
ee
e
ee
ρλβδλρδ
ρλσρδφδ
ρλβδλρδ
ρλσρδφδ λλ γα −+−+
Δ−−−+
−+−+
Δ+−−+ <−< , 
eβρ
δλ 21+>  and 
2
2 )1(22
e
e
ρ
ρλ
λσ −>  ;  
6) 
)1()1)(1(2
)]1(2[)1(
)1()1)(1(2
)]1(2[)1(
222
2222
222
2222
ee
e
ee
ee
e
ee
ρλβδλρδ
ρλσρδφδ
ρλβδλρδ
ρλσρδφδ λλ γα −+−+
Δ+−−+
−+−+
Δ−−−+ <−< ,  
eβρ
δλ 21+<  and 
2
2 )1(22
e
e
ρ
ρλ
λσ −< . 
 
Proof: See Appendix G.     Q.E.D. 
 
According to equations (37)-(38) and similar to persistent inflation shocks, persistent 
exchange rate shocks and hence the opacity have no effect on the variances of inflation and real 
exchange rate if their effects on the demand through the above mentioned two channels offset 
each other, i.e. 0=− γα . In the case where γα ≠ , an increase in opacity also has no effect on 
the variance of inflation if the rate of preference perception error is such that 
eδφρ
φδδγα
λ
λλ ++−− = )1)(( 2 . 
Similarly, an increase in opacity also has no effect on the variance of real exchange rate if the 
perception error is such that 
e
e
δφρδ
φδδγαρλβδ
λ
λλ
)1(
])1)(][()1[(
2
22
+
++−−+− = .  
In the cases where γα ≠  and the conditions on the preference perception error leading to the 
absence of opacity effect are not satisfied, the conditions under which an increase in opacity 
positively affects the variance of inflation and real exchange rate are quite similar to these 
defined in Proposition 3a, except the critical values for γα − , λ  and 2λσ . Similar discussions 
can be made. 
Having shown how the opacity affects the level and volatility of economic variables, we can 
examine if there is a case for more opacity. When the central bank decided to increase the opacity 
about its preference, it accepted lower equilibrium inflation (and higher output gap) in exchange 
of greater macroeconomic instability. If the equilibrium level of inflation (and output gap) was 
increasing (and decreasing respectively) in opacity, there would be no such trade-off between the 
equilibrium level and volatility of inflation (and output gap) with respect to the degree of opacity. 
In the case where both inflation level and variability were increasing in opacity, the most 
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desirable situation is that the central bank should be fully transparent ( 02 =λσ ). Inversely, if both 
inflation and macroeconomic variability were decreasing in opacity, there would be a case for 
monetary policy opacity.  
According to Proposition 1c, we have 02 <∂
∂
λσ
π t  if )1(21 πλ
λλ
δ
φδ ργα −+ −−<− . According to 
Proposition 3a, we have 02
22 >∂
∂
λ
π
σ
σ  under conditions 1-6. In the presence of persistent inflation 
shocks, the trade-off is possible if we have simultaneously 02 <∂
∂
λσ
π t  and 02
22 >∂
∂
λ
π
σ
σ , i.e. the 
condition )1(21 πλ
λλ
δ
φδ ργα −+ −−<−  and one of the six groups of conditions in Proposition 3a are 
checked simultaneously. However, the case for transparency could be more compelling since 
Propositions 1c and 3a have shown that if γα −  is sufficiently large or low, more opacity could 
reinforces the effects of persistent inflation shocks on the level and volatility of inflation.  
Similar discussions about the possibilities of trade-off between the levels of inflation and 
output gap and their volatility could be done in the presence of persistent exchange rate shocks. 
When there is no such trade-off, the cases for total transparency or total opacity could exist and 
the conditions could be examined in comparing the conditions under which we have 
simultaneously 02 >∂
∂
λσ
π t  and 02
22 >∂
∂
λ
π
σ
σ  (or respectively  02 <∂
∂
λσ
π t  and 02
22 <∂
∂
λ
π
σ
σ ). We remark that, if 
the central bank had also objective of stabilising the variability of real exchange rate, the 
conditions for a trade-off between inflation reduction and macroeconomic stability would be 
further complicated. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have analytically examined how the pass-through of persistent inflation and 
exchange rate shocks to the rest of the economy, in particular to the inflation and real exchange 
rate dynamics, is affected by the political transparency in monetary policymaking. Existent 
theoretical and empirical studies show that increasing central bank transparency could 
meaningfully diminish the volatility of inflation, real exchange rate and output gap. Furthermore, 
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the adoption of flexible exchange rate regime could increase the incentive to be more transparent 
in the conduct of monetary policy.  
If the effect of real exchange rate on the marginal cost is absent, the opacity affects the level 
and variability of endogenous variables only in the presence of persistent inflation shocks. When 
the marginal effect of real interest rate on the domestic goods demand is exactly compensated by 
that of real exchange rate, the opacity has not any effect whatever is the nature of the shocks. 
Under some other conditions imposed on the perception error of the central bank preference, the 
opacity also could have no effect on macroeconomic variability. 
The effect of opacity on the transmission of persistent inflation and exchange rate shocks to 
the levels of inflation and real exchange rate and their expected future values could be positive, 
null or negative, depending on the structural parameters of the economy as well as these 
characterizing the preferences of the central bank. More precisely, it depends on the interest 
elasticity of demand for domestic goods, the degree of trade openness, the effect of real exchange 
rate on the marginal cost and the slope of the Phillips curve, the perceived and realised weight 
that the central bank assigns to the output target, and the initial level of opacity. We have found 
that, generally if the difference between two key parameters, i.e. the interest elasticity of demand 
for domestic goods and the degree of trade openness, is sufficient large or sufficiently low, an 
increase in opacity reinforces the effect of these shocks on the endogenous variables. For 
intermediate values of the difference between these two key parameters, an increase in opacity 
could reinforce or weaken the effect of persistent inflation and exchange rate shocks according to 
the conditions imposed on other structural parameters, including these characterising the central 
bank preferences. 
We have also shown that an increase in opacity could increase the variance of inflation and 
real exchange rate both when the difference between the above-mentioned two key parameters is 
sufficiently large or low with critical values depending on all structural parameters characterising 
the economy as well as the central bank preferences (expected value of preference parameter, 
initial degree of opacity). For intermediate cases, more opacity could also increase the 
macroeconomic volatility under conditions imposed on the expected relative weight that the 
central bank assigns to output target and/or the initial degree of opacity. 
Our result implies that when there is perfect capital mobility, high degree of domestic 
financial development, which is the case in many industrial countries, could justify an increase in 
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the political transparency of monetary policymaking. This theoretical result coincides with some 
empirical evidences showing that countries adopting flexible exchange rate regime tend to be 
more transparent in the conduct of monetary policy. 
 
Appendix A:  The case where 0=φ  
If 0=φ , the equation (16) becomes: 
π
ββλ
δ εππ ttttE 111 2 −= ++ .        (A.1) 
Using the method of undetermined coefficients to solve  equaiton  (A.1) and guessing that 
πεζπ tt 1=  and hence 11 ζερπ ππ ttttE Ε=+ , we obtain: 
ββλ
δπ ζρζ 1111 2 −=Ε +t .        (A.2) 
Taking expectations of equation (A.2) and using second-order Taylor development, i.e. 
...][ 2111 3
222 ++=Ε +++ λλβ δλβδβλδ σt , we obtain the solution of 1ζtΕ  and 1ζ  as follows: 
πλ ρλβσδδλ
λζ 32222 3 )1()1(1 −+++=Εt , 
])1()1()[1(
])1()1([
1 322222
2222
πλ
λ
ρλβσδδλδ
σδδλλζ −++++
+++= . 
The effect of opacity is deduced from these solutions as follows: 
0232222
23
2
1
])1()1([
)1( <= −+++
+−
∂
Ε∂
πλλ ρλβσδδλ
δλ
σ
ζt , 
02322222
32
2
1
])1()1()[1(
)1( <= −++++
+−
∂
∂
πλ
π
λ ρλβσδδλδ
ρλβδλ
σ
ζ .    Q.E.D. 
 
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1b.  
The effects of opacity on 1+Ε tet can be obtained through the relationship 2 12 1 λ
π
λ σ
χρ
σ d
d
d
ed ttt ΕΕ =+ . It is 
then sufficient to know the sign of 2
1
λσ
χ
d
d tΕ . Deriving 1χtΕ  given by equation (28) with respect to 
2λσ  yields: 
)]1()1)(()(][))(1)[(1()()1( 222222
1 ππππ
λ
ρφδδγαργαλβφδγαδρργαλδδσ
χ −−+−−−+−+−−+Ψ−=Ε
d
d t .  
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i) An increase in opacity has positive effect on 1χtΕ  if the following condition is satisfied: 
0]))(1)][(1()1)(()()[( 22 <+−+−−+−−−− φδγαδρφδδγαργαλβγα ππ . 
Four combinations of inequalities allowing the above condition to be checked are considered:   
The first combination, where we have simultaneously 0)( >− γα , 0))(1( 2 <+−+ φδγαδ  
and 0)1()1)(()( 2 >−−+−−− ππ ρφδδγαργαλβ , has no solution since if 0)( >−γα  then 
0]))(1[( 2 >+−+ φδγαδ .  
The second combination, where we have concurrently 0)( >− γα , 0))(1( 2 >+−+ φδγαδ  
and 0)1()1)(()( 2 <−−+−−− ππ ρφδδγαργαλβ , has one solution. The first two inequalities 
imply 0>− γα . The third inequality is verified in two cases: if πβρδλ
21+> , we have 
21
)1(
δρλβ
ρφδ
π
πγα −−
−>− ; if πβρδλ
21+<   we have 021
)1( <<− −−
−
δρλβ
ρφδ
π
πγα . The final solution is: 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧>− −−
−
21
)1(;0max δρλβ
ρφδ
π
πγα  with πβρδλ
21+> .  
The third combination, where we have simultaneously 0)( <− γα , 0))(1( 2 <+−+ φδγαδ  
and 0)1()1)(()( 2 <−−+−−− ππ ρφδδγαργαλβ , has two solutions. Solving the first two 
inequalities yields: 21 δ
φδγα +−<− . Solving the third inequality gives: if πβρδλ
21+>  and 
21
)1(
δρλβ
ρφδ
π
πγα −−
−<−  ; if πβρδλ
21+<  and 21
)1(
δρλβ
ρφδ
π
πγα −−
−>− . Combing these conditions leads to: 1) 
21 δ
φδγα +−<−  if πβρδλ
21+> ; 2) 22 11
)1(
δ
φδ
δρλβ
ρφδ γα
π
π
+−−
− −<−<  if πβρδλ
21+< .  
The last combination, where we have simultaneously 0)( <− γα , 0))(1( 2 >+−+ φδγαδ  
and 0)1()1)(()( 2 >−−+−−− ππ ρφδδγαργαλβ , has one solution. The first two inequalities 
imply: 021 <−<− + γαδ
φδ . The third inequality yields: if πβρ
δλ 21+> , then 021
)1( >>− −−
−
δρλβ
ρφδ
π
πγα  ; if  
πβρ
δλ 21+<  then 021
)1( <<− −−
−
δρλβ
ρφδ
π
πγα . That leads to: πβρδλ
21+<  and 22 1
)1(
1 δρλβ
ρφδ
δ
φδ
π
πγα −−
−
+ <−<− .  
ii) An increase in opacity has negative effect on 1χtΕ  if the following condition is satisfied: 
 0]))(1)][(1()1)(()()[( 22 >+−+−−+−−−− φδγαδρφδδγαργαλβγα ππ . 
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Considering similarly four combinations of inequalities as before and solving them, we obtain 
the pairs of conditions given in the second part of Proposition 1b.     Q.E.D. 
 
Appendix C:  Proof of Proposition 2b 
In the presence of persistent exchange rate shocks, the effect of opacity on 1+Ε tet  
( 2
2
2
1
λλ σ
χρ
σ ∂
∂
∂
∂ =+ etEe ) is obtained by deriving 2χtΕ  given by equation (32) with respect to 2λσ   as 
follows: 
.)1(            
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2
22222222
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e
eee
t
φαδρδ
σφαδρδλαβρλδφδγαδργαφδδ λσ
χ
λ
+Ω+
++−++−+Ω−+=∂
Ε∂
i) Using the definition of Ω  in the above derivative and after some rearrangement, we find that 
having 022 >∂
∂
λσ
χ  is equivalent to have:  
{ } 0])([))(1(]))(1[( 2222 >+−−+−++−+Ω λαρφδγαλβφδγαδφδγαδ e . 
The above inequality is true in two cases.  
In the first case, we must have simultaneously 0))(1( 2 >+−+ φδγαδ  and 
0])([))(1( 2 >+−−+−+ eρφδγαλβφδγαδ . That yields two solutions: 1) If eβρδλ
21+< , these 
two inequalities imply that 21 δ
φδγα +−>−  and )1(
)1(
2)(
e
e
ρλβδ
ρφδγα −+
−−>− , that leads to 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −−>− −+
−
+ e
e
ρλβδ
ρφδ
δ
φδγα 22 1
)1(
1
;max)( . 2) If 
eβρ
δλ 21+> , the solution satisfying these two inequalities 
is 
e
e
ρλβδ
ρφδ
δ
φδ γα −+
−
+ −<−<− 22 1
)1(
1
. 
 
In the second case, we must have simultaneously 0))(1( 2 <+−+ φδγαδ  and 
0])([))(1( 2 <+−−+−+ eρφδγαλβφδγαδ . That leads to another two possible solutions: 1) If 
eβρ
δλ 21+< , the solution satisfying these two equalities is ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −−<− −+
−
+ e
e
ρλβδ
ρφδ
δ
φδγα 22 1
)1(
1
;min . 2)  If 
eβρ
δλ 21+> , we must have simultaneously 21 δ
φδγα +−<−  and e
e
ρλβδ
ρφδγα −+
−−>− 21
)1( . Since 
eβρ
δλ 21+>  
implies 01 2 <−+ eρλβδ  , the second solution cannot be viable and only the first solution is valid.  
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ii) Consider the conditions under which we have 022 <∂
∂
λσ
χ . The latter is equivalent to have:  
{ } 0])([))(1(]))(1[( 2222 <+−−+−++−+Ω λαρφδγαλβφδγαδφδγαδ e . 
In the first case, we must have simultaneously 0))(1( 2 >+−+ φδγαδ  and 
0])([))(1( 2 <+−−+−+ eρφδγαλβφδγαδ . That yields two solutions: 1) If eβρδλ
21+< , we have 
e
e
ρλβδ
ρφδ
δ
φδ γα −+
−
+ −<−<− 22 1
)1(
1
. For the latter condition to be checked, we must have β
δλ 21+< , 
which is compatible with the initial condition 
eβρ
δλ 21+< . The latter condition implies βδλ 21+< . 2) 
If 
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ρφδ , then the solution is 
e
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ρλβδ
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)1( .  
In the second case, we must have simultaneously 0))(1( 2 <+−+ φδγαδ  and 
0])([))(1( 2 >+−−+−+ eρφδγαλβφδγαδ . That leads to another two possible solutions: 1) If 
eβρ
δλ 21+< , we obtain 22 11
)1(
δ
φδ
ρλβδ
ρφδ γα +−+
− −<−<−
e
e  . The latter condition implies λβδ <+ 21 , which 
is consistent with 
eβρ
δλ 21+<   2) If 
eβρ
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e
e
ρλβδ
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−−<− 21
)1( . Since 021
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−
e
e
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φδγα +−<− .    Q.E.D. 
 
Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 2c  
In the presence of persistent exchange rate shocks, the effects of opacity on inflation 
persistence ( 2
2
2 λλ σ
ζρ
σ
π
∂
∂
∂
∂ = et ) is obtained by deriving 2ζ  given by (29) with respect to 2λσ : 
}])1)([()({))(1( 222222 φδδγαλδφρλλλαφρδφργαδλσ
ζ ++−+−−+Ω=∂
∂
eee .       
We have  022 >∂
∂
λσ
ζ   in two cases: In the first case, we must have simultaneously 0>− γα  and 
0])1)([()( 2 >++−+− φδδγαλδφρλλ e . That leads to: 
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 })1( ;0{max 21 eργα λλλδ
φδ −
+ −−>− . 
In the second case, we must have simultaneously 0<− γα  and 
0])1)([()( 2 <++−+− φδδγαλδφρλλ e . That yields: 
})1( ;0{min 21 eργα λλλδ
φδ −
+ −−<− .  
 To obtain negative effect of opacity, i.e. 022 <∂
∂
λσ
ζ , it is equivalent to have 
0}])1)([()({)( 2 <++−+−− φδδγαλδφρλλγα e . Two cases are distinguished. In the first case, 
we must have simultaneously 0>− γα  and 0])1)([()( 2 <++−+− φδδγαλδφρλλ e . That 
leads to )1(0 21 eργα λλλδ
φδ −
+ −−<−< . This condition is valid only if  eρλλλ 1>− .  
In the second case, we must have simultaneously 0<− γα  and 
0])1)([()( 2 >++−+− φδδγαλδφρλλ e . Solving these two inequalities leads to: 
0)1(21 <−<−− −+ γαρλλλδ
φδ
e . This condition is valid only if  eρλ
λλ 1<− .   Q.E.D. 
 
Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 2d 
In the presence of persistent exchange rate shocks, the effects of opacity on te  
( 2
2
2 λλ σ
χρ
σ
π
∂
∂
∂
∂ = et ) is obtained by deriving 2χ  given by equation (30) with respect to 2λσ  : 
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We obtain 022 >∂
∂
λσ
χ  in two cases. In the first case, we must have simultaneously 0>− γα  and 
0])1)()[(1())(1( 222 >++−−++−+ φδδγαρλβδλδφρλλδ ee . That leads to two solutions: 1) 
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λ
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+
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e
e . 
In the second case, we must have simultaneously 0<− γα  and 
0])1)()[(1())(1( 222 <++−−++−+ φδδγαρλβδλδφρλλδ ee . There are two solutions: 1) 
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In the second case, we must have simultaneously 0<− γα  and 
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Appendix F: Proof of Proposition 3a 
 According to equations (35) and (36), if γα ≠ , πφδρ φδδγαλλλ ++−− ≠ )1)((
2
 and  
22
2222
))(1)(1(
)1())(1()1(
λγαδρ
λρδφσργαδ
λ
ρλρλ
π
πλπππ
−+−
−−−+−+ ≠ , the sign of 22
22
λπε
π
σσ
σ
∂∂
∂  as well as 22
22
λπε σσ
σ
∂∂
∂ e  is the same as 
that of )( γα −Ψ . Hence, we only study the conditions under which )( γα −Ψ  is positive. To 
have 0)( >−Ψ γα  is equivalent to have one of the following groups of conditions satisfied: 
1) 0>Ψ  and 0>− γα  ; 
2) 0<Ψ  and 0<− γα .  
Taking account of the definition of Ψ , it is easy to show that the inequality 0>Ψ  is 
equivalent to 
,0)1)((])([])1)([())(1(
)()1(])1[(
2223
22222
>}−+−−+−}{++−−−+{
+−}++−+{−
φδδγαρφδγαλβφδδγαργαδλ
φργαλσδδλβλδδ
ππ
πλ  
which after some arrangements and simplification becomes: 
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0)1()())(1)(1)(1( 2222222 >−+−Θ−−−−++ δφλργαδφγαρρλβδδλ πππ , 
 or equivalently: 
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If 0)1)(1)(1(4)( 4222222 >−−++−Θ=Δ λφδρρλβδδδφ πππ , we can solve the above 
inequality in distinguishing two cases as follows.  
In the first case, both expressions in braces must be positive, i.e. 
0
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In the second case, both expressions in braces must be negative, i.e. 
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conditions in Proposition 3a. 
Under the second group of conditions (i.e. 0<Ψ  and 0<− γα ), we can similarly show that   
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following two cases.  
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two inequalities can not be true simultaneously if  πβρ
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Appendix G: Proof of Proposition 3b  
According to equations (37) and (38) if γα ≠ , and  
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e  is the same as that of )( γα −Ω . Hence, we study only the 
conditions under which )( γα −Ω  is positive. We remark that the inequality 0)( >−Ω γα  can be 
checked under two groups of conditions: 1) 0>Ω  and 0>− γα ; 2) 0<Ω  and 0<− γα . 
Consider now the first group of conditions. To have 0>Ω  is equivalent to have: 
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We distinguish two cases. In the first case, both expressions in braces must be positive, i.e. 
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)]1(2[)1(
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2222 >−− −+−+
Δ±−−+
ee
e
ee
ρλβδλρδ
ρλσρδφδ λγα . That yields two conditions: 
1) 
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ee
e
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eβρ
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In the second case, both expressions in braces must be negative, i.e. 
0
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)]1(2[)1(
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Δ±−−+
ee
e
ee
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ρλσρδφδ λγα . That leads to another two conditions: 
1) 
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ee
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ee
e
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ρλβδλρδ
ρλσρδφδ λγα −+−+
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Taking account of the condition 0>− γα , these results lead to the first four conditions of 
Proposition 3b. 
Consider now the second group of conditions with 0<Ω  and 0<− γα . The inequality  
0<Ω  has two solutions. The first is: 
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This is possible when πβρ
δλ 21+> . Taking account of the condition 0<− γα , we must also have 
0)1(2 222 >−− ee ρλσρ λ , i.e. 2
2 )1(22
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The second solution is: 
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Δ−−−+ <−<  
This is possible when πβρ
δλ 21+< . Given the condition 0<− γα , we must also have 
0)1(2 222 <−− ee ρλσρ λ , i.e. 2
2 )1(22
e
e
ρ
ρλ
λσ −< .       Q.E.D. 
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